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“I PRONOUNCE YOU MAN AND MAN. YOU MAY NOW FILE
JOINTLY FOR BANKRUPTCY”: DOMA’S
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY AND ITS EFFECT ON JOINT
BANKRUPTCY FILINGS FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES
Michael S. Tomback∗
ABSTRACT
Bankruptcy courts are no longer constrained by the mantra: “Bankruptcy
is for Adam and Eve, not Adam and Steve.” In 2013, Windsor v. United States
marked the erosion of the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996. Post-Windsor, the
operative definition sections of that Act—defining “marriage” and “spouse”
for “any Act of Congress”—no longer control. The meaning of marriage and
spouse under federal law and, specifically, the Bankruptcy Code is now
unclear. This lack of clarity affects interpretation of important provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code that provide for joint bankruptcy filings.
What is the outcome when lawfully married couples, same-sex couples in
particular, file jointly for bankruptcy in a state that does not recognize their
marriage? Now that the Defense of Marriage Act’s definitions no longer apply
in the bankruptcy context, this Article argues that lawfully married same-sex
couples should be allowed to file for bankruptcy jointly under 11 U.S.C. § 302
in all bankruptcy courts, even if the couple files jointly in a state that does not
recognize their union. Under federalism principles, the Bankruptcy Code
∗ Law Clerk to the Honorable Ronald H. Sargis, Bankruptcy Judge for the Eastern District of California;
J.D., Emory University School of Law (2014). The author hopes that this Article provides same-sex couples
the chance to have a fresh start. He would like to thank his family, friends, and colleagues for their continued
support and encouragement. The author would like to thank John Barlow and Sarah O’Donohue for their input,
critiques, and aid in drafting this Article. The author would like to specifically thank Professor Dorothy Brown
and Professor Lesley Carroll for their constant support, insight, and push to complete this Article. The author
hopes that the reader finds within the Article the same hope and optimism that he found in writing it.
This summer, the Supreme Court is expected to decide Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015). The
disposition of Obergefell will likely affect the applicability of arguments set forth in this Article. However, this
Article touches on much more than the issues at play in Obergefell—a case focused on the equal protection and
due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This Article seeks to balance state sovereignty and federal authority in the context of marriage. The
task of balancing tradition, fundamental rights, and federalism is as old as the Republic and will remain
relevant in a bankruptcy context no matter how the Court rules in Obergefell. It is our hope that readers will
find the following discussion informative and enlightening both before and after any anticipated rulings this
summer.
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should apply the definitions of marriage and spouse from the state of
celebration to provide same-sex couples equal access to the federal bankruptcy
system.
While the full impact of Windsor on the Bankruptcy Code remains to be
seen, this Article proposes an interpretive framework that permits same-sex
couples to file for bankruptcy jointly in any state while leaving state-level
restrictions on marriages between same-sex couples untouched.
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INTRODUCTION
Following the decision in United States v. Windsor,1 the Bankruptcy Code
(the “Code”) is no longer limited to the narrow definitions of spouse and
marriage in the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”).2 The Code now allows
for an interpretation that will give married same-sex couples3 equal access to
the bankruptcy system.4
The impact of Windsor5 has been, and will likely continue to be, felt in
almost every field of law.6 The Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor sparked a
major a shift towards equality for same-sex couples in the United States.7 Soon
the Court will determine whether that shift is permanent.8 Practically speaking,
the Windsor ruling correctly shifts the definition of marriage and marital rights
back to the authority of the states under their police powers, subject to
constitutional guarantees.9 This in turn opens the door for same-sex couples to
enjoy the same rights and privileges as their heterosexual counterparts at the
federal level.10 Windsor signals an important societal change towards equal
1

133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684 (2013).
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7
(2012)), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
3 This Article will adopt the assumption that, when speaking of a married same-sex couple, the marriage
is legal and recognized in the couple’s state of celebration. This premise is necessary because the same-sex
couple should have the same standing as heterosexual couples.
4 While some states have recognized civil unions, which grant same-sex couples similar rights to their
heterosexual counterparts, for the purpose of this Article, same-sex marriage will be the focus.
5 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675.
6 Some of these other areas of law include, but are not limited to, federal tax treatment, estate planning,
choice-of law, etc. See LEON GABINET, TAX ASPECTS OF MARITAL DISSOLUTION §3:12 (2d ed., rev. 2012);
Meghan V. Alter, The High Price for Leveling the Playing Field: The Socioeconomic Divide in Estate
Planning for Same-Sex Couples, 25 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 32 (2011); William Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice
of State Law in Federal Statutes, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (2012).
7 Since the Supreme Court decided Windsor and as of March 2, 2015, four circuit courts of appeals have
struck down state bans on marriage between same-sex couples, leading to an exponential increase in the
number of states that authorize performance and recognition of those marriages. See generally Latta v. Otter,
771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed, 83 U.S.L.W. 3589 (U.S. Dec. 31, 2014) (No. 14-765), and
petition for cert. filed sub nom., Idaho v. Latta, 83 U.S.L.W. 3589 (U.S. Jan. 2, 2015) (No. 14-788); Baskin v.
Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 663 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S.
Ct. 265 (2014). At this point, with those circuit court rulings intact, marriage between same-sex couples is
legal in thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia. Same-Sex Marriage Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS.
(Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-laws.aspx.
8 See Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556 (U.S. argued Apr. 28, 2015).
9 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
10 See, e.g., Implementing United States v. Windsor for Purposes of Entitlement and Enrollment in
Medicare Hospital Insurance and Supplementary Medical Insurance, 80 Fed. Reg. 7975, 7975–76 (Feb. 13,
2015) (citing Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416, 426, 426–1, 1395i–2, 1395p, 1395r (2012)), available at
2
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rights for homosexual couples. Specifically, in the context of bankruptcy
filings, the finding that DOMA’s definitions of spouse and marriage are
unconstitutional allows married same-sex couples to avail themselves of a
legal process long embedded in our nation’s history.
Through DOMA, Congress imposed a federal limitation on the rights of
same-sex couples and individuals in those same-sex relationships. Notably, and
most importantly for this Article, DOMA defined marriage as “only a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife,” and spouse as
“only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”11 1 U.S.C.
§ 7, also known as § 3 of DOMA, broadly applied these definitions when
“determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United
States.”12 Given the expansive language of 1 U.S.C. § 7, if there was an “Act
of Congress” that used either the term marriage or spouse in the text, § 7
definitions would apply.13 In bankruptcy, that meant that any use of spouse or
marriage in the Code became limited to heterosexual couples. As a result,
lawfully married same-sex couples were prevented from using the bankruptcy
system for a “fresh-start.”14 For sixteen years, these definitions acted as a
discriminatory ceiling, preventing married same-sex couples from enjoying the
traditional rights and privileges enjoyed by their heterosexual counterparts.
However, following Windsor, the over 1,000 federal statutes that DOMA’s
limited definitions had a binding effect on are now left undefined and
http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Rulings/Downloads/CMS4176R.pdf (instructing the
Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services to look to the state of domicile to determine marital status under
§§ 416, 426, 426–1 because § 416 explicitly invokes the state of domicile but to look to the state of celebration
to determine marital status under §§ 1395i–2, 1395p, 1395r to treat “same-sex marriages on the same terms as
opposite-sex marriages to the greatest extent reasonably possible . . . .”); see also The Supreme Court Ruling
on the Defense of Marriage Act: What It Means, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/publications/
after-doma-summary (last visited Mar. 27, 2015).
11 1 U.S.C. § 7, invalidated by Windsor, 113 S. Ct. 2675. DOMA also prevented same-sex couples from
filing joint tax returns and severely limited same-sex spouses of governmental employees from Social Security
survivor benefits and prevented the sharing of medical benefits. See 26 U.S.C. § 1(a)–(c); 42 U.S.C.
§ 402(f)(i). See generally Lynn D. Wardle, Who Decides? The Federal Architecture of DOMA and
Comparative Marriage Recognition, 41 CAL. W. INT’L. L.J. 143 (2010) (discussing the federal and state
architecture of the ramification of DOMA on individual state recognition of same-sex marriage).
12 1 U.S.C. § 7. See generally Heather Hamilton, The Defense of Marriage Act: A Critical Analysis of its
Constitutionally Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 943 (1998) (discussing the
history of DOMA and its reading under the Full Faith and Credit clause); Sherri L. Toussaint, Defense of
Marriage Act: Isn’t It Ironic . . . Don’t You Think? A Little Too Ironic, 76 NEB. L. REV 924 (1997) (discussing
the history of DOMA and its effect on homosexuals).
13 1 U.S.C. § 7.
14 See generally Bone v. Allen (In re Allen), 186 B.R. 769 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995).
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susceptible to multiple meanings.15 The ramifications of finding § 3 of DOMA
unconstitutional are far reaching. Since, under the holding in Windsor, the
Supreme Court found the definitions of 1 U.S.C. § 7 unconstitutional, any act
that adopted such definitions as a premise for the provisions of that title now
must be re-evaluated to determine how married same-sex couples fall into
those provisions. Due to the unconstitutionality of the federal definitions of
spouse and marriage under DOMA, this Article asserts that same-sex couples
should now be permitted to jointly file for bankruptcy under chapters 7 and 13,
regardless of the state in which the bankruptcy petition is filed. In addition,
these same-sex couples should be able to use, at the minimum, the allowable
federal exemptions, as long as the couple is lawfully married in a state that
recognizes such unions.
Part I of this Article explains the background of DOMA, its interaction
with the Code, and the holding of Windsor. Part II.A argues that federalism
principles and the Tenth Amendment require the Code to read same-sex
couples into the definitions of marriage and spouse in the Code provisions. Part
II.B asserts that this reading furthers the goals of 11 U.S.C. § 302(a), the
section of the Code permitting filing of joint cases. Part II.C argues that samesex couples filing jointly must, at a minimum, be able to use the federal
exemptions of 11 U.S.C. § 522(d). Part II.D outlines some potential
ramifications that may result if same-sex couples are able to file jointly under
the framework proposed. Lastly, Part II.E describes the possible alternatives
that would allow same-sex couples to file jointly even if this Article’s
framework is not adopted.
I. BACKGROUND
A. DOMA and the Bankruptcy Code
The passage of DOMA represented the federal government’s attempt to
define and limit the rights of homosexuals on a national scale. Congress passed
DOMA in response to Baehr v. Lewin, a 1993 case in Hawaii that concerned
the issuance of same-sex marriage licenses and the effect these licenses would
have on both federal and state levels.16

15

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2690.
852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). The Baehr court suggested that marriage licenses that are limited to
heterosexual couples may discriminate against homosexuals and could be a violation of equal protection. Id. at
69.
16
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Concerned about the potential impact of homosexual couples getting
married and attempting to get recognition by other states—in addition to the
issue of federal benefits for homosexual couples—Congress passed DOMA.17
Congress’s stated purposes in passing DOMA were to: (1) “defend the
institution of traditional heterosexual marriage;” and (2) “protect the right of
the States to formulate their own public policy regarding the legal recognition
of same-sex unions . . . .”18
DOMA had two operative sections: (1) choice-of-law provisions; and (2)
federal definitions provisions.19 The choice-of-law provisions skew the full
faith and credit requirement by allowing states to deny credit “to any public
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State . . . respecting a
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under
the laws. . . .”20 DOMA’s definitions provisions, however, have a much more
dramatic effect.21
DOMA, in attempting to accomplish the broad purpose of “defend[ing] the
institution of traditional heterosexual marriage,” narrowly tailored the
definitions of spouse and marriage to only include heterosexual couples.22
DOMA defined marriage as “only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife.”23 Spouse in DOMA is defined as “only
[married] to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”24
Examining the legislative history of DOMA, it seems that the motivating factor
for DOMA’s passage came about as reinforcement of a historical

17 See generally Susan E. Hauser, More Than Abstract Justice: The Defense of Marriage Act and the
Equal Treatment of Same-Sex Married Couples Under Section 302(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, 85 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 195, 215–16 (2011) (discussing the purpose of Congress passing DOMA).
18 H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906.
19 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012);
28 U.S.C. § 1738C); see Jackie Gardina, The Perfect Storm: Bankruptcy, Choice of Law, and Same-Sex
Marriage, 86 B.U. L. REV. 881, 893–94 (2006).
20 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012). Traditional full faith and credit requires states to recognize and respect
each other’s laws. See generally Mark D. Rosen, Why the Defense of Marriage Act is Not (Yet?)
Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors that Determine What the
Constitution Requires, 90 MINN. L. REV. 915 (2006).
21 1 U.S.C. § 7, invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 113 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). While the choice-of-law
provision of DOMA is substantial, for the purposes of this Article and the Code, the definitions outlined in 1
U.S.C. § 7 more definitively affect homosexual couples from jointly filing for bankruptcy under the Code.
22 H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906; see 1 U.S.C. § 7.
23 1 U.S.C. § 7.
24 Id.
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understanding of marriage and spouse.25 To ensure that these limited
definitions had a far-reaching and pervasive impact, Congress drafted 1 U.S.C.
§ 7 so that the definitions of spouse and marriage applied in “determining the
meaning of any Act of Congress,” making its influence substantial in federal
law.26
Bankruptcy law and procedures are defined and outlined in title 11 of the
United States Code.27 The essence of bankruptcy is “grounded upon the public
policy of freeing the honest, but unfortunate debtor from the financial burdens
of prepetition indebtedness and thereby allowing the debtor to make an
unencumbered fresh start.”28 11 U.S.C. § 101 sets out the definitions for the
terms used in title 11 and in bankruptcy proceedings.29 The Code does not, in
11 U.S.C. § 101 or anywhere else, specifically define spouse or marriage as it
would apply to the Code individually.30
The Code uses the terms spouse and marriage over sixty times in both
operative and definitional sections.31 The Code, in 11 U.S.C. § 302(a), outlines
how joint cases work within the bankruptcy system.32 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) states
that a joint case is “commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a
single petition . . . by an individual that may be a debtor . . . and such
individual’s spouse.”33 The definition of joint case applies to filings under
chapter 7 liquidation bankruptcies, chapter 13 restructuring bankruptcies, and
chapter 11 restructuring bankruptcies.34 Section 302 “was designed for ease of

25 See, e.g., A Bill to Define and Protect the Institution of Marriage: Hearing on S. 1740 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 27 (1996) (written statement of Lynn D. Wardle, Professor of Law,
Brigham Young University) (“Section 3 [of DOMA] appears to embody quite accurately the actual historical
intent and expectation of Congress and federal law generally that when these marriage terms are used in
federal laws, same-sex couples were not intended to be included.”); 142 Cong. Rec. 16,969 (1996) (statement
of Rep. Charles Canady) (“But now, it is necessary to make explicit in the federal code Congress’ wellestablished and unquestionable intention that ‘marriage’ is limited to unions between one man and one woman.
Section 3 [of DOMA] changes nothing; it simply reaffirms existing law.”).
26 1 U.S.C. § 7.
27 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
28 George H. Singer, Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Fundamentals of Nondischargeability in
Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 325 (1997) (citing U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v.
Smith, 807 F.2d 122, 123–24 (8th Cir. 1986).
29 11 U.S.C. § 101.
30 Id.
31 See generally, Jackie Gardina, The Defense of Marriage Act, Same-Sex Relationships and the
Bankruptcy Code 14–35 (Vt. Law Sch., Paper No. 04-12 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1850926.
32 11 U.S.C. § 302(a).
33 Id.
34 Id.

TOMBACK GALLEYSPROOFS

382

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

7/9/2015 12:53 PM

[Vol. 31

administration and to permit the payment of only one filing fee.”35 By allowing
this consolidation, the bankruptcy system reflected more clearly the reality of
marital relations as it concerns debt and property ownership.36 Additionally,
joint cases aid in the efficiency of the court by consolidating the cases to single
hearings and meetings to save cost and ensure ease.37
Through the application of 1 U.S.C. § 7 to the Code, only opposite-sex
couples were permitted to file joint cases.38 Courts reaffirmed this application
by barring same-sex couples from seeking relief as joint debtors under 11
U.S.C. § 103(a).39 Interestingly, in 2011, the United States Trustee’s Office, a
division of the Department of Justice whose sole responsibility is monitoring
the bankruptcy system, released a statement that the office would no longer
oppose same-sex couples filing jointly.40 This is significant because it signals
that the federal office in charge of enforcing the Code no longer finds the joint
filing of same-sex couples to violate the purpose of the bankruptcy system.41

35 In re Stuart, 31 B.R. 18, 19 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983); see also In re Knobel, 167 B.R. 436 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1994); In re Birch, 72 B.R. 103 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1987); In re Hulk, 8 B.R. 444 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
36 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 32 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5818.
37 See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 302.02[1] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.
2010) (“A joint case will facilitate the efficient administration of [the debtors’ estates] and decrease the costs
associated with administration, thereby benefiting both the debtors and their creditors.”); see also Stuart, 31
B.R. at 19.
38 11 U.S.C. § 302(a).
39 See, e.g., In re Wilkerson, No. 05-54096-JDW, 2006 WL 3694638 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Mar. 29, 2006);
In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 2004); see generally Hauser, supra note 17 (discussing the
effect of DOMA on 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) prior to Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Human Services,
682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012)). However, there have been cases in which same-sex couples were allowed such
filings, specifically in California. See, e.g., In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (court denied a motion
to dismiss filed by the U.S. Trustee on the grounds that DOMA barred a same-sex couple from filing for
bankruptcy jointly because a dismissal would not serve an important governmental interest).
40 See U.S. Shifts Policy on Same-Sex Bankruptcies, REUTERS.COM (July 8, 2011), http://www.reuters.
com/assets/print?aid=USTRE76770020110708.
41 See id. Additionally, other federal government programs and benefits have started recognizing samesex marriages, permitting these married same-sex couples access to the same benefits and programs as their
heterosexual counterparts. These include immigration benefits, veteran/military benefits, and certain tax
benefits. See Kathleen Michon, Federal Marriage Benefits Available to Same-Sex Couples, NOLO, http://
www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/same-sex-couples-federal-marriage-benefits-30326.html (last visited May
7, 2015).
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B. Windsor v. United States
On June 16, 2013, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Windsor,42
holding that § 3 of DOMA is “unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty
of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.”43
Windsor concerned a taxpayer whose same-sex partner had passed away
and was denied the benefit of spousal deduction because of DOMA.44 Under
the federal tax law, the benefits of a spousal deduction were limited to spouses
as defined by 1 U.S.C. § 7, and thus were only available to heterosexual
couples.45
In 2007, Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer were married in a lawful ceremony
in Ontario, Canada.46 New York law recognized and deemed their Ontario
marriage to be valid.47 In February 2009, Spyer passed away and left her entire
estate to Windsor.48 Under DOMA, Windsor and Spyer’s marriage did not
receive federal recognition and, therefore, Windsor did not qualify for the
federal estate tax marital exemption.49 Under the exemption, Windsor would
have been able to exclude from taxation “any interest in property which passes
or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse . . . .”50 The Internal
Revenue Service denied the refund on the basis that Windsor was not a
“surviving spouse” under DOMA’s limited definition.51 Windsor paid the tax
and then subsequently commenced a refund suit in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York arguing that DOMA violated
equal protection under the Fifth Amendment.52
42

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
Id. at 2695.
44 Id. at 2682.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 2683 (citing Windsor v. United States, 699 F. 3d 169, 177–78 (2d Cir. 2012)).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (2012).
51 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.
52 Id. While the suit was pending at the District Court, the Attorney General of the United States notified
the Speaker of the House of Representative that the Department of Justice would not defend the
constitutionality of § 3 of DOMA. Id. The Attorney General did this through a 28 U.S.C. § 530D letter. In this
case, it was unusual “because the §530D letter was not preceded by an adverse judgment.” Id. Instead, the
letter “reflected the Executive’s own conclusion, relying on a definition still being debated and considered in
the courts, that heightened equal protection scrutiny should apply to laws that classify on the basis of sexual
orientation.” Id. at 2683–84. In response, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of
Representatives (BLAG) voted to intervene in the pending suit to defend § 3 of DOMA. While the Department
of Justice did not oppose the limited intervention by BLAG, the District Court denied BLAG’s motion to enter
43
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The District Court ruled against the United States, holding that § 3 of
DOMA is unconstitutional and ordered that the Treasury refund the tax with
interest to Windsor.53 The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling,
applying “heightened scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orientation, as
both the Department of Justice and Windsor had urged.”54
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of the
constitutionality of § 3 of DOMA.55 The Court started its discussion with a
brief history of same-sex marriage in the country, noting that states started
recognizing these marriages so these same-sex couples could “have the right to
marry and so live with pride in themselves and their union and in a status of
equality with all other married persons.”56
The Court moved on to analyze the “design, purpose, and effect of
DOMA.”57 The Court stated that “by history and tradition the definition and
regulation of marriage . . . ha[d] been treated as being within the authority and
realm of the separate States.”58 However, the Court continued that “Congress,
in enacting discrete statutes, can make determinations that bear on marital
rights and privileges” and that “Congress has the power both to ensure
efficiency in the administration of its programs and to choose what larger goals
and policies to pursue.”59
The Court relied on the fact “there is no federal law of domestic
relations”60 and that “federal courts, as a general rule, do not adjudicate issues
of marital status even when there might otherwise be a basis for federal
jurisdiction.”61 Additionally, the Court noted, “for ‘when the Constitution was
adopted the common understanding was that the domestic relations of husband
and wife and parent and child were matters reserved to the States.’”62

the suit as of right but did grant intervention by BLAG as an interested party. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P.
24(a)(2)).
53 Id. at 2684.
54 Id. This was the first time heightened scrutiny was used for homosexuals as a class. See Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
55 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684.
56 Id. at 2689.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 2689–90.
59 Id. at 2690.
60 Id. at 2691 (quoting De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956)).
61 Id. (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992)).
62 Id. (quoting Ohio ex. rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383–84 (1930)).

TOMBACK GALLEYSPROOFS

2015]

7/9/2015 12:53 PM

DOMA’S UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

385

Before beginning its analysis, the Court started with its conclusion that
“DOMA seeks to injure the very class New York seeks to protect. By doing so
it violates basic due process and equal protection principles applicable to the
Federal Government.”63
Once the Court cemented that marriage and domestic relations are within
the realm of the individual states, the Court attacked DOMA as “reject[ing] the
long-established precept that the incidents, benefits, and obligations of
marriage are uniform for all married couples within each State, though they
may vary, subject to constitutional guarantees, from one State to the next.”64
Looking to same-sex couples, the Court concluded that “the State’s decision to
give this class of persons the right to marry conferred upon them a dignity and
status of immense import.”65 After establishing this background, the Court
framed the question on the constitutionality of DOMA as “whether the
resulting injury and indignity is a deprivation of an essential part of the liberty
protected by the Fifth Amendment.”66
The first part of the Court’s analysis concentrated on the two diverging
purposes between the New York marriage law and DOMA.67 To frame the
differences, the Court juxtaposed the two against each other: “What the state of
New York treats as alike federal law deems unlike by a law designed to injure
the same class the State seeks to protect.”68
In discussing DOMA, the Court found “DOMA’s unusual deviation from
the usual tradition of recognizing and accepting state definitions of marriage”
highlighted that its “avowed purpose and practical effect . . . are to impose a
disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into samesex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”69 With
this conclusion, the Court held “DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of
the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution.”70

63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Id. at 2693 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)).
Id. at 2692.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2692–93.
Id. at 2692.
Id. at 2693.
Id. at 2695.
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While never explicitly saying so, the Court seemed to apply a heightened
level of scrutiny to find DOMA unconstitutional, closely aligned with the
intermediate scrutiny test.71 The Court in its opinion, however, did not classify
same-sex couples as any type of class or identify what level of scrutiny it was
applying. While the exact scope and impact of Windsor on the classification of
homosexuals remains unknown, Windsor does make one thing certain—§ 3 of
DOMA no longer binds federal statutes to the heteronormative definitions of
marriage and spouse.
II. FOLLOWING WINDSOR, LAWFULLY MARRIED SAME-SEX COUPLES SHOULD
BE ALLOWED TO FILE JOINTLY FOR BANKRUPTCY UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 302(A)
Following the rulings in Windsor, married same-sex couples are now left
with two questions: (1) whether their marriage will allow them to jointly file
for bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) and (2) whether they can use the
federal exemptions outlined in the Code. With the state definition of marriage
controlling, married same-sex couples fall within the scope of potential joint
debtors under 11 U.S.C § 302(a) and should be given the same rights and
privileges as heterosexual couples in bankruptcy.
A. A State’s Definitions of Spouse and Marriage Are Now Controlling When
Reading and Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code
If DOMA no longer applies, where would one look for the definitions of
marriage and spouse as they apply to the Code? This query raises the
significant question of whether a same-sex couple that has been recognized in
71 In analyzing the level of scrutiny applied by the Court in Windsor, it is important to understand the
traditional levels of constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 2683–84. The lowest form of scrutiny, the rational basis test,
looks to whether a law is rationally related to a legitimate purpose. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). If an act does not have a legitimate purpose rationally related to the act, the Court
would find that the law is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause. See,
e.g., id. Rational basis is typically applied in cases where there are no fundamental rights or suspect
classifications at issue. The intermediate scrutiny test looks to whether a law furthers an important government
interest by means that are substantially related to that interest. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
If an act does not have an important government interest that is substantially related to that interest, then the
law in question is unconstitutional under Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., id.
Classically, intermediate scrutiny has been applied by the Court to analyze laws that impact or involve gender
or other quasi-suspect classes such as children or the socially vulnerable. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Under strict scrutiny, an act is constitutional only if the act furthers a
compelling governmental interest that is narrowly tailored the law to achieve that interest. See, e.g., Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 213 (1944). This level of scrutiny has been reserved for laws that impact race or
fundamental liberties such as marriage, individual autonomy, free speech, and the exercise of religious
liberties. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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a state can use that state’s definition for the purposes of bankruptcy. Based on
federalism principles and Tenth Amendment considerations, if a same-sex
couple is lawfully married in a state that recognizes such a union, then—
regardless of the state in which the same-sex couple files for bankruptcy—the
bankruptcy court must recognize the marriage for purposes of bankruptcy and
allow the couple to file jointly.72
1. Federalism Policy and Choice-of-Law Concerns
The essential question that is left following Windsor is a choice-of-law
problem: Which definitions of marriage and spouse now control the Code?73
Without the Code defining marriage and spouse, the meanings of these words
remain unresolved until a definitive answer can be given on whether these
terms now include married same-sex couples.74
In his pre-Windsor article, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal
Statutes, William Baude offers a framework in which the states’ definitions of
marriage and spouse may be adopted by the Code.75 Baude explained that the
most difficult choice that Congress faces, a choice that is still relevant after
Windsor, is which state’s law it will adopt for federal purposes.76 Should a
bankruptcy court look to the law of the state in which the marriage is
celebrated or the state of the couple’s domicile? If the court looks to the law of
the state of domicile, should the court look to the couple’s domicile at the time
of marriage or the domicile at the time of filing?77 Resolution of these issues
requires speculation about Congress’s intent and the potential for forcing states
that do not recognize same-sex unions to recognize such marriages.78
As Baude noted, “[m]arried couples expect that, legal quirks aside, when
they marry they will remain married unless and until they formally divorce.”79
72 What may result is a return to a pre-DOMA status in which a same-sex couple married in one state
should be able to file jointly in any state. See Bone v. Allen (In re Allen), 186 B.R. 769, 773 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1995) (suggesting, pre-DOMA, that a same sex couple may be able to file jointly under the Code if their
marriage is recognized in the state of celebration).
73 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 302 (2012) (joint filing for spouses).
74 Without the controlling definitions of 1 U.S.C. § 7, the Bankruptcy Code lacks an explicit definition
for marriage and spouse.
75 Baude, supra note 6.
76 Id. at 1417.
77 Id. at 1394–97 (discussing application of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1931),
and other cases involving conflict of laws between different states in federal courts).
78 Id. at 1417.
79 Id.
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The only way to ensure that such a mentality and traditional understanding of
marriage prevails to both married opposite-sex and same-sex couples is to
interpret and apply a liberal definition of marriage as used in a state that
recognizes same-sex marriages.80 Baude argues that all lawful marriages
should be recognized in any state, regardless of whether that state would be
willing to issue a marriage license for the couple, advocating for a federal
choice-of-law rule that would respect all lawful marriages.81
In the context of bankruptcy, applying this rule to federal provisions in the
Code would require a bankruptcy court sitting in State A, which does not
recognize same-sex marriage, to accept the otherwise valid joint petition of a
same-sex couple lawfully married in State B.82 State A, though, would not be
compelled to allow the couple access to the benefits or rights that State A only
allows to opposite-sex couples under its own law.83 This interpretation rule
would require every bankruptcy court to look to the state of celebration of the
marriage to recognize lawful marriages, both opposite-sex and same-sex, but
not necessarily for other applications of state law.84
Baude explains that this rule should prevail by stating: “Same-sex couples
may not have the same guarantees with respect to state law, but at least with
respect to nationwide federal law, they can and should.”85 Furthermore, this
rule ensures balance between state and federal law because it does not allow
federal law to be unfairly and disjunctively applied on a state-by-state basis but
instead allows every citizen to avail themselves of federal processes and
laws.86 Under any other interpretation, the result would be an unfair
distribution of federal rights and, in the case of bankruptcy, would lead to a
geographic barrier to same-sex joint filings. For instance, a same-sex couple
filing in the state of celebration would be able to avail themselves of the
federal bankruptcy system but would be barred from filing if they move to a
state that does not recognize same-sex marriage.87 Such a result is
fundamentally inequitable.
80

Id.
See id. at 1415–17.
82 See supra note 10. See generally, In re Matson, 509 B.R. 860 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2014).
83 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012); see also Baude, supra note 6 at 1416–17.
84 Baude, supra note 6 at 1416–17.
85 Id. at 1417.
86 See id.
87 Cf. Gigi Douban, Some Same-Sex Couples Still Struggle at Tax Time, MARKETPLACE (Mar. 16, 2015),
http://www.marketplace.org/topics/economy/some-same-sex-couples-still-struggle-tax-time (describing the
difficulty some couples face when they move to a state that does not recognize their marriage).
81
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The Code, as it currently stands, does have some inherent geographic
preferences based on the state in which the debtors file, such as state
exemptions for those domiciled in that state.88 However, these preferences do
not affect the bankruptcy process such that they would potentially disallow an
entire class of people from filing.89 Fixing this variation in state policies into
the Code, in contrast, forces same-sex couples who wish to file jointly and
want to utilize federal exemptions to move to a different state so that the
domicile requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 522 does not apply.90 On a practical level,
at the very least, this causes upheaval for the personal lives of same-sex
couples and their families.
On choice-of-law issues under the Baude framework, a rule that adopts the
definition of marriage and spouse from the state of celebration would be the
most legal and equitable as it applies to the Code.91 This would create a
balance that would allow states to continue to define marriage and spouse
within their own borders without limiting the definitions given by other
states.92 In terms of bankruptcy, this means that a marriage celebrated in of one
of the thirty-seven states that recognize same-sex marriage should be
recognized under the Code.93 This would result in allowing same-sex couples
to file jointly under 11 U.S.C. § 302(a).94
A rule that defines marriage and spouse for the purpose of filing a
bankruptcy petition does not infringe on the individual rights of the states to
define marriage within their own borders.95 The states would retain authority to
manage the issuance of marriage licenses. The federal and state balance would
remain while allowing same-sex couples the ability to file jointly for
bankruptcy.
2. Tenth Amendment and Legislative Interpretation
The Tenth Amendment offers a framework from which to base the
assertion that the definitions of marriage and spouse from the state of
88 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b); Tarvin, Bankruptcy, Relocation, and the Debtor’s Dilemma: Preserving Your
Homestead Exemption Versus Accepting the New Job Out of State, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 149 (2011).
89 See Tarvin, supra note 88 at 149.
90 11 U.S.C. § 522; see also infra Part II.C.
91 See Baude, supra note 6 at 1418.
92 See id. at 1416–17.
93 See id. at 1418; see also NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGIS., supra note 7.
94 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (listing requirements for joint filing).
95 See Baude, supra note 6 at 1418.
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celebration should now be read into the Code.96 By doing so, individual states
would retain control over their own definitions of marriage and spouse for
purposes of marriage licensing and similar issues. However, they would be
prevented from barring same-sex couples access to a federal institution, such
as the bankruptcy system, through those definitions.
The Tenth Amendment provides: “The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the People.”97 It is a well-established principle that
states have traditionally been given the authority to regulate marriages within
their own borders.98 The Constitution does not, in any article, grant Congress
the power to define marriage or any marital rights. There has been some
argument that Congress, under either the Spending Clause or the Commerce
Clause, may be able to define marriage and spouse because of the economic
ramifications that these definitions may have on interstate commerce or federal
taxation.99 However, these rationales try to shroud moral motivations in an
economic mask and do not trump the overwhelming precedent and tradition
that has granted states the right to control the terms of marriages within their
own borders.100
Given the substantial amount of case law concerning the longstanding state
right to define marriage and the lack of case law that has adopted the purported
economic reasoning for a federal definition of marriage, arguments in favor of
Congress’s power to define marriage arguably would not survive.101
Federalism principles seem to dictate that Congress must give deference to the
96

U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Id.
98 See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (“Insofar as marriage is within temporal
control, the States lay on the guiding hand. ‘The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife,
parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.’” (quoting In re
Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890))); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (“[T]he State does
not contend in its argument before this Court that its powers to regulate marriage are unlimited
notwithstanding the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor could it do so . . . .”); Massachusetts v.
U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 11–13 (1st Cir. 2012) (reasoning that, while DOMA did
not violate the Tenth Amendment, it violated the Equal Protection Clause after infringement on an area of law
traditionally governed by states).
99 See, e.g., Grant S. Nelson, A Commerce Clause Standard for the New Millennium: “Yes” to Broad
Congressional Control Over Commercial Transactions; “No” to Federal Legislation on Social and Cultural
Issues, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1213, 1241 (2003).
100 Id.
101 See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734–35 (1878) (“The State . . . has absolute right to prescribe
the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for
which it may be dissolved.”).
97
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states when defining marriage and spouse.102 The Tenth Amendment reinforces
this premise.103 It follows that any federal statute that uses terms that are
defined by the states should be interpreted to allow all citizens equal access to
federal statutory schemes and rights.104
Legislative interpretation techniques further support the argument that the
definitions of marriage and spouse in the Code should respect state definitions
of marriage and spouse.105 Typically, in order for Congress to impede on a
traditionally held state right, a clear statement is required.106 This clear
statement requirement arises from the substantive federalism canon of
legislative interpretation.107 The purpose of the federalism canon is to protect
state sovereignty and autonomy.108
DOMA arguably acted as Congress’s clear statement that it wished to
supplant, in some respects, the state’s traditionally exclusive power governing
marriage and to apply a federal definition to federal programs.109 However,
Windsor invalidated Congress’s preemption of the use of state definitions on
the federal level by finding § 3 of DOMA unconstitutional.110 With this
invalidation of § 3, the federal government may no longer use its own
definitions of marriage and spouse in the Code and other affected statutes.111
Without this federal directive in place, the choice-of-law analysis requires that
the states’ definitions of marriage and spouse govern.112
The spirit of the Tenth Amendment leads us to the conclusion that states
should have dominion over the issuance and control of marriage within their
102

See supra Part II.A.1.
See U.S. CONST. amend. X. But see Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 11–13 (“In our view, neither the Tenth
Amendment nor the Spending Clause invalidates DOMA . . . .”).
104 See infra Part II.C.1.
105 See generally Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare
Decisis, and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 69 MD. L. REV. 791
(2010) (discussing the canons of construction).
106 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461, 464, 467 (1991) (refusing to broaden federal powers to
impede on traditional state powers without clear statement from Congress).
107 See id.
108 See Slocum, supra note 105, at 813 (“[S]everal federalism canons are based on the assumption that
Congress is concerned with federalism issues and desires to preserve local authority.”).
109 See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); H.R. REP.
No. 104-664, at 1–18 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906 (describing the history behind the
perceived need for DOMA and the governmental interests offered to support its passage).
110 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695; cf. Baude, supra note 6, at 1415–18 (discussing and suggesting a system
of choice-of-law concerning DOMA).
111 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695.
112 See supra Part II.A.1.
103
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own borders. However, this dominion does not grant an individual state the
authority to block its citizens from access to a federal process. To respect the
states’ authority to regulate marriage while protecting citizens’ access to
bankruptcy, the Code should be interpreted to adopt the same definitions of
marriage and spouse of the state of celebration, not the state of domicile. This
interpretation would permit same-sex couples to file for joint bankruptcies
under 11 U.S.C. § 302(a), regardless of the state in which the same-sex couple
files.
B. Allowing Same-Sex Couples to Jointly File Furthers the Goals of 11 U.S.C.
§ 302(a) by Easing the Bankruptcy Process
When enacting § 302(a), Congress noted that, due to the fact that married
couples tend to have joint debts and joint property, the bankruptcy system
should reflect that reality by allowing married couples to file jointly.113 The
Senate Judiciary Committee explained, “A joint case will facilitate
consolidation of their estates, to the benefit of both the debtors and the
creditors, because the cost of administration will be only one filing fee.”114 The
purpose of § 302(a), read along with the purpose of the overall bankruptcy
system to “provide a fresh start for the honest debtor” and “to protect the rights
of creditors by creating an organized system that governs the repayment of
debts,”115 would be furthered by allowing same-sex couples to file jointly.
Courts have construed literally the marriage requirement of § 302(a), thus
limiting joint filings to couples that are lawfully married.116 With this limited
reading, the bankruptcy courts would have to recognize same-sex couples as
married under the language of the Code.117
Under the framework proposed in this Article, the purpose of § 302(a)
would further be satisfied because it would allow lawfully married same-sex
113 See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 32 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5818; supra text
accompanying notes 31–37.
114 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 32 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5818.
115 Jill C. Rush, Unequal Treatment and Creditor Frustrations: The Limited Impact of Legalizing Same
Sex Marriage, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 743, 745–46 (2005).
116 See Hauser, supra note 17 at 200–12 (describing the history of § 302(a) and how courts would not
allow “unmarried debtors who live together,” “an adult child,” and “a corporation and its sole shareholder” to
file jointly under § 302(a)) (citing In re Lucero, 408 B.R. 348 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2009); In re Jephunneh
Lawrence & Assocs. Chartered, 63 B.R. 318 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1986); In re Malone, 50 B.R. 2 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1985); In re Jackson, 28 B.R. 559 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983); In re Coles, 14 B.R. 5 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1981)).
117 See id.
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couples who have incurred joint debt to consolidate their bankruptcies for the
sake of efficiency.118 By allowing same-sex couples to file jointly, creditors
would now have access to a larger estate to satisfy their claims.119
Furthermore, a smaller administrative fee would be incurred in a joint filing,
preserving some, albeit marginal, wealth for the bankruptcy estate.120 Since an
overarching purpose of bankruptcy is to protect creditors’ rights to repayment
of debts, by interpreting the Code to allow married same-sex couples to file
jointly under § 302(a), creditors would now have a far better chance of getting
a higher rate of return on their debt than if same-sex couples had to file
separately and the spouses were not jointly liable for the debt.121
C. Same-Sex Couples Filing Jointly Can Avail Themselves of Either Federal
or State Exemptions
With the adoption of the above interpretative framework, which would
allow same-sex couples that are lawfully married to file jointly, the issue now
becomes which exemptions the jointly-filing couple may use.122 First, under
federalism principles, the same-sex couple should be able to, at a minimum,
use the federal exemptions outlined in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) even if an individual
state, under its police power, chooses to provide access to those exemptions
only to heterosexual couples.123 Second, the Code should be amended to
guarantee availability of each state’s exemptions to all lawfully married
couples even if such state does not recognize the marriage under its law.
1. Under Federalism Principles, Jointly Filing Same-Sex Couples Should
Be Able to Avail Themselves of at Least the Federal Exemptions of 11
U.S.C. § 522(d)
Jointly filing same-sex couples permitted to apply the exemptions of a state
that recognizes their marriage would be able to apply either federal
exemptions—if that state permits—or the state’s exemptions.124 However,
under the federalism framework offered by this Article, a state that does not
118

11 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).
See id. § 541.
120 See In re Stuart, 31 B.R. 18, 19 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983); see also In re Knobel, 167 B.R. 436 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1994); In re Birch, 72 B.R. 103 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1987); In re Hulk, 8 B.R. 444 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1981).
121 See 11 U.S.C. § 302.
122 See id. § 522.
123 See id. § 522(d).
124 See id.
119
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recognize same-sex marriage should not have to allow same-sex couples filing
jointly in that state to take advantage of its bankruptcy exemptions.125
Under the Code, a state is authorized to “opt-out” of the federal exemptions
and require that its citizens use that state’s individual exemptions.126 Staying
true with the federalism argument, states remain sovereign over the marital
systems within their borders, which means that they do not have to allow
same-sex couples to use their exemptions.127 For example, an individual state
may limit its own exemptions to only heterosexual married couples. So if a
state does not recognize same-sex marriages within its borders that state would
not have to offer to a jointly filing couple the exemptions that are offered to a
heterosexual couple.128 This distinction would create an additional burden for
same-sex couples by limiting their ability to file jointly because, without
access to any exemptions, the entire estate would be vulnerable to creditors.
However, the state would not be able to completely bar same-sex couples from
filing individually and then applying the state’s exemptions as individual filers.
While a state’s ability to limit access to its exemptions may seem counter to
the federalism analysis, it in fact further reinforces the separation of state and
federal powers and the need for equal access of all citizens to federal laws and
protections.129 The Code applies to all citizens regardless of residency.130
Exemptions, however, may be either from the federal code itself or
supplemented or substituted by the laws of individual states.131 If a state
chooses to have its own exemptions for bankruptcies, then the state has the
authority to apply them under the definitions it has set.132 So, if State A’s
exemption is limited to a “married couple,” and State A does not recognize
same-sex marriages, then, if federalism is the exclusive concern, a jointly filing
lawfully married same-sex couple ought not be able use the exemption.
However, state exemptions should be read to allow jointly filing same-sex
couples to use the federal exemptions listed in 11 U.S.C. § 522 if a state does

125

See id. § 522(b).
See id.; Tarvin, supra note 88, at 149.
127 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 12
(1st Cir. 2012).
128 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A).
129 See supra Part II.A.
130 See 11 U.S.C. § 109(a).
131 Id. § 522(b).
132 See id.
126
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not recognize their marriage for state law exemptions.133 If the state is an optout state that only allows its own exemptions to apply and does not recognize
same-sex marriages, it must allow same-sex couples that are lawfully married
in other states to use the federal exemptions. For the same reasons that the
Code should be read to include same-sex couples, states should not, under the
guise of federalism, be able to limit same-sex couples’ access to the federal
exemptions that are available to all citizens.
This suggested framework concerning state exemptions versus federal
exemptions satisfies state sovereignty because it does not require the state to
change its own policy to accommodate the decisions of a sister state. It
satisfies federalism principles because it gives all U.S. citizens equal access to
exemptions, either through state exemptions or, if excluded from state
exemptions, federal exemptions. This balance resembles the legal
constructions that require the Code terms marriage and spouse be read
according to a state that recognizes same-sex marriage because it focuses on
the need for a balance between state and federal power.
2. Amendment to 11 U.S.C. § 522
To ensure that this proposed framework does not create a power shift where
states would be able to unjustly prohibit same-sex couples filing jointly from
using both state exemptions and federal exemptions, 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) should
be amended.134 Such an amendment could either create a carve out giving
same-sex couples access to the federal exemptions if a state limits access to its
exemptions only to heterosexual couples or restructure the exemptions in the
Code to a federal floor system in which states can then supplement by
authorizing more exemptions than federally mandated.135
Section 522 of the Code sets forth the various exemptions a debtor may
take in his or her petition.136 Section 522(b) represents a compromise between
the Senate and the House concerning whether federal exemptions or state
133 See generally id. § 522. Interestingly, 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) discusses the inability of joint filers to
each choose different exemptions on their petition. This restriction is of note because the Code, when
discussing an involuntary filing of a spouse, defines marriage as a “husband and wife.” Id. A strict textual
reading of the section arguably limits the scope of the “husband and wife” phrase to cases involuntarily filed
under 11 U.S.C. § 303.
134 Where debtors are domiciled in a state that does not recognize their marriage, when applying certain
provisions of the Code, a bankruptcy court may be constrained by that state’s definitions of marriage. See
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C).
135 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 522(b).
136 Id. § 522.
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exemptions should be controlling on a debtor’s petition.137 Essentially, 11
U.S.C. § 522(b)(1)138 gives the debtor two options: 1) the debtor may use the
federal exemptions outlined in § 522(d); or 2) the debtor may use the
exemptions of the applicable state law.139 However, these options can be
limited if the state in which the debtor files has opted out of the federal
exemptions.140
The language of 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) gives states the option to opt-out of
the federal exemptions of § 522(d), which limits a debtor filing in that state to
the exemptions of that state alone.141 The relevant language in § 522(b)(2)
states: “[P]roperty listed in this paragraph is property that is specified under
subsection (d), unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor under
paragraph (3)(A) specifically does not so authorize.”142 For a state to opt out
of 11 U.S.C. § 522(d), a state would need to pass a statute to bar citizens from
using the federal exemptions.143 To date, thirty-four states have enacted
legislation that has limited debtors to the state exemptions.144
For a debtor to use these state exemptions, the Code has a domicile
prerequisite that requires that the debtor file in
137 James B. Haines, Jr., Section 522’s Opt-Out Clause: Debtors’ Bankruptcy Exemptions in a Sorry State,
1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 6 n.26 (1983).
138 Section 522(b)(1) states:

Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt from property of the
estate the property listed in either paragraph (2) or, in the alternative, paragraph (3) of this
subsection. In joint cases filed under section 302 of this title and individual cases filed under
section 301 or 303 of this title by or against debtors who are husband and wife, and whose estates
are ordered to be jointly administered under Rule 1015(b) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, one debtor may not elect to exempt property listed in paragraph (2) and the other
debtor elect to exempt property listed in paragraph (3) of this subsection. If the parties cannot
agree on the alternative to be elected, they shall be deemed to elect paragraph (2), where such
election is permitted under the law of the jurisdiction where the case is filed.
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1).
139 Id. § 522(b)(1), (d).
140 Id. § 522(b)(1).
141 Richard E. Mendales, Rethinking Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 40 B.C. L. REV. 851, 859 (1999).
142 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2) (emphasis added).
143 Haines, supra note 137, at 8.
144 Id. at 4 & n.13. These states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See, e.g., NY DEBT. &
CRED. LAW § 284 (Consol. 2014) (“In accordance with the provisions of section five hundred twenty-two (b)
of title eleven of the United States Code, debtors domiciled in this state are not authorized to exempt from the
estate property that is specified under subsection (d) of such section.”) (example of an opt-out statute).

TOMBACK GALLEYSPROOFS

2015]

7/9/2015 12:53 PM

DOMA’S UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

397

the place in which the debtor’s domicile has been located for the 730
days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition or if
the debtor’s domicile has not been located in a single State for such
730-day period, the place in which the debtor’s domicile was located
for 180 days immediately preceding the 730-day or for longer portion
of such 180-day period than in any other place.145

If the debtor qualifies as being domiciled in a state under § 522(b)(3)(A),
and that state has an opt-out statute, then that debtor is limited to that state’s
exemptions.146 If the debtor is unable to meet the domicile requirement of
§ 522(b)(3)(A), the debtor may use the exemptions in § 522(d).147 Thus,
debtors who are unable to claim a residency under any of the domicile
requirements of § 522(b)(3)(A) default into the exemptions of § 522(d),
regardless of whether the state in which the debtors currently reside has an optout statute.148 Cases, both prior to and after the enactment of Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Prevention Act, have found that “federal
exemptions [are] available under the exemption saving sentence where a
debtor is not residing in the state under whose law the debtor’s exemptions are
determined, even when those states have opted out of the federal
exemptions.”149
Under the proposed federalism framework allowing lawfully married samesex couples to file jointly for bankruptcy in any state, § 522 would need to be
amended to ensure that same-sex couples can avail themselves of the federal
exemptions.150 To ensure that a state does not try to circumvent the application
of the allowance of same-sex couples from jointly filing for bankruptcy under
the proposed interpretation of the Code, 11 U.S.C. § 522 should have language
that would reframe the opt-out powers of the states to limit them so as to not

145

11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A).
Id. § 522(b)(1).
147 Id. § 522(b)(3) (“If the effect of the domiciliary requirement under subparagraph (A) is to render the
debtor ineligible for any exemption, the debtor may elect to exempt property that is specified under subsection
(d).”).
148 See, e.g., In re Underwood, 342 B.R. 358, 362 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2006).
149 In re Fabert, No. 06-21539, 2008 WL 104104, at *1, *20 (D. Kan. Jan. 9, 2008); see also In re
Chandler, 362 B.R. 723, 726–27 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2007); In re Battle, 366 B.R. 635, 637 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 2006) (“[T]he Court holds that a non-Florida-resident debtor, forced into using Florida exemption law by
section 522(b)(3)(A), may elect to use the federal exemptions under section 522(b)(2), because Florida’s optout law does not bar non-residents from claiming federal exemptions.”); In re Schulz, 101 B.R. 301, 302
(Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989) (finding that, pre-BAPCPA, the non-resident was not bound by an opt-out state’s
statute and was allowed to use the federal exemptions).
150 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 522(b).
146
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bar same-sex couples from both state and federal exemptions when filing
jointly.151
As discussed above,152 § 522 needs an interpretation that would permit a
state to retain its authority to legislate its own exemptions while ensuring that
same-sex couples are still able to use the federal bankruptcy system.153 Under
this interpretation, in order to ensure that a state can retain its police power in
controlling the exemptions available to its residents, § 522(b) should add a
subparagraph that would carve out an exception to the opt-out authority for the
state that would still allow same-sex couples to use § 522(d) exemptions.154
As it stands now, § 522(b) enables a state to prevent all of its citizens from
accessing the federal exemptions of § 522(d).155 This blanket limitation would
allow the state to limit jointly filing same-sex couples from any spouse
exemptions that would be available to similarly situated heterosexual
couples.156 Without an amendment to § 522, a state would be able to make a
DOMA-like barricade on same-sex couples wishing to file jointly by severely
limiting their options for exemptions.157
To place a safeguard so that states do not attempt to use this apparent
loophole to limit and deter same-sex couples from filing within its border,
Congress should add a paragraph at the end of § 522(b). This paragraph would
exempt jointly filing same-sex couples from having solely to use an opt-out
state’s exemptions if the state’s joint exemptions apply only to heterosexual
couples. A state is well within its police powers to determine those exemptions
and limitations within its borders, but those powers should not have the ability
to unfairly limit the access of same-sex couples to the bankruptcy system.158 A
proposed amendment that would create the balance between state sovereignty
and equal access to exemptions for same-sex couples would be:
If the effect of paragraph (3) is to render jointly filing debtors
ineligible for certain exceptions or limits their access to certain
exceptions due to state or local law concerning sexual orientation, the
state exemption is to be read as including lawfully married same-sex
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

See generally id. § 522(b).
See supra Part II.C.1.
See generally 11 U.S.C. § 522(b).
See id. § 522(b), (d).
Id.
See id.
See id.
See supra Part II.C.1.
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couples. A state or local law limits or renders jointly filing debtors
ineligible from certain exemptions if the state or local law actually or
constructively bars same-sex couples from applying state or local
exemptions based solely or in part on the debtors’ sexual orientation.

This proposed amendment would allow the state to remain in control of its own
exemptions under the opt-out powers of § 522(b), but would impair it from
using that power to limit the access to married same-sex couples.159
Alternatively, some commentators have proposed getting rid of the opt-out
system of § 522 and instead enacting a federal floor that states would then have
the option of supplementing.160 James B. Haines, Jr., in his piece Section 522’s
Opt-Out Clause: Debtors’ Bankruptcy Exemptions in a Sorry State, argues that
enacting a federal floor provision instead of an opt-out ability would enable
Congress to “enact a federal provision effecting federal fresh start
objectives.”161 This provision would not only reinforce the federalism equal
access framework where a minimum standard is available to all citizens, but
would also streamline the exemptions available to debtors.162
However, this system would have a more limiting effect on the ability for
states to police their social policies by not allowing them to have complete
control over their own exemptions. While states would be able to alter the
exemptions to supplement the federal floor, the states would be unable to have
complete control over the access to these exemptions. Compared to the
suggestion of amending § 522 to add a carve out of the opt-out option, the
federal floor gives a universal base that all states would have to follow.163 This
floor would ease the bankruptcy process because it would place every debtor at
the same starting point concerning exemptions. In contrast, the current opt-out
system is inherently confusing due to exemptions that vary by state.164
It is worth noting that while § 522(b) does cite to Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 1015(b) as one of the possible conflicts that may
159

See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b).
Haines, supra note 137, at 41; see H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., § 522(b) (1977). See generally W. Homer
Drake, Jr., The Judges’ Bankruptcy Bill and the Commission’s Bill: A Question of Access to the Judicial
Process, 26 MERCER L. REV. 1009, 1027–28 (1975); Joe Lee, A Critical Comparison of the Commission Bill
and the Judges’ Bill for the Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 49 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 22–24 (1975)
(discussing the difference between the Commission’s Bill and Judges’ Bill with respect to their treatment of
state exemptions vis-à-vis federal exemptions).
161 Haines, supra note 137, at 41–42.
162 See id. at 41.
163 See Haines, supra note 137, at 41; supra Part II.C.1.
164 See Haines, supra note 137, at 41.
160
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arise when determining whether state or federal exemptions apply to joint
filing spouses, the fact that it is limited to “husband and wife” debtors does not
adversely affect the options in amending or changing § 522(b).165 This
provision is narrowly tailored for the cases that are an involuntary
consolidation of individual cases of a husband and wife.166 It would be
preferable for Rule 1015 and § 522(b) of the Code to be amended to change the
language from “husband and wife” to “spouses,” but, under the interpretation
of this Article, it does not create an issue with which exemptions would
apply.167
Either of these options—(1) amending § 522(b) with the carve out or, (2)
replacing the opt-out provision with a federal floor—would ensure that under
the post-Windsor interpretation of the Code, all citizens would have fair and
equal access to the bankruptcy process.168 The revision of § 522(b) to have a
federal floor would better serve the Code and federalism principles, though,
because it integrates into the Code the minimum that each state must offer,
165

Section § 522(b)(1) states:
In joint cases filed . . . against debtors who are husband and wife, and whose estates are ordered
to be jointly administered under Rule 1015(b) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, one
debtor may not elect to exempt property listed in paragraph (2) and the other debtor elect to
exempt property listed in paragraph (3) of this subsection. If the parties cannot agree on the
alternative to be elected, they shall be deemed to elect paragraph (2), where such election is
permitted under the law of the jurisdiction where the case is filed.

11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (2012). FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b) states:
If a joint petition or two or more petitions are pending in the same court by or against (1) a
husband and wife, or (2) a partnership and one or more of its general partners, or (3) two or more
general partners, or (4) a debtor and an affiliate, the court may order a joint administration of the
estates. . . . An order directing joint administration of individual cases of a husband and wife
shall, if one spouse has elected the exemptions under § 522(b)(2) of the Code and the other has
elected the exemptions under § 522(b)(3), fix a reasonable time within which either may amend
the election so that both shall have elected the same exemptions. The order shall notify the
debtors that unless they elect the same exemptions within the time fixed by the court, they will be
deemed to have elected the exemptions provided by § 522(b)(2).
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b).
166 See 11 U.S.C. § 303.
167 Id. § 522(b); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015.
168 A third approach would be to have a same-sex married couple move their residency if they are
currently located in an opt-out state in order to make the couple fail the domicile requirement of
§ 522(b)(3)(A) and default into the federal exemptions. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A). This approach would
allow the debtors to get around the limiting provision of § 522(b)(2), which bars debtors from using the federal
exemptions, by making the same-sex debtors not domiciled under the Code. See id. § 522(b). By not being
domiciled to any particular state, only the federal exemptions of § 522(d) would apply to the same-sex couple
jointly filing, and same-sex couples in bankruptcy would avoid unfair treatment from the exemptions of an
opt-out state. See id. § 522(b)(3)(A).
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including allowing jointly filing same-sex couples to use exemptions, while
still giving the states the ability to supplement the exemptions based on that
state’s individual prerogatives.169 Additionally, if Congress were to amend
§ 522 to have a federal floor, it would create a smoother understanding of
exemptions across state borders instead of the current disjunctive nature of
states having the option to implement their own individual exemptions.170
D. Ramifications of Same-Sex Joint Filings
Under the post-Windsor interpretation of the Code discussed above, samesex couples now have the ability to file joint bankruptcies with the exact same
rights and powers as jointly filing heterosexual couples.171 Nevertheless, this
does present new issues for same-sex couples wanting to file jointly. Now that
same-sex couples would have the same posture as heterosexual couples, they
would be subject to the same limitations that the Code places on married
couples.
Under the DOMA definitions, 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) did not apply to samesex couples, and an individual who was in a same-sex marriage but was filing
for a chapter 13 bankruptcy individually was not required to disclose the
income of his or her spouse because the Code and 1 U.S.C. § 7 did not
recognize same-sex spouses.172 Now, though, under the scheme proposed
above, the debtor would need to disclose the same-sex spouse’s income,
regardless of whether they were filing jointly. This may result in the filing
spouse becoming an above-median debtor under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d)(1),
triggering the five-year plan requirement.173 Additionally, this may result in a
higher projected disposable income, which would lead to higher monthly
payments under the plan.174
Debt limitations may also become problematic for same-sex couples now
wanting to file jointly under chapter 13 of the Code. Under 11 U.S.C. § 109(e):
an individual with regular income and such individual’s spouse,
except a stockbroker or a commodity broker, that owe, on the date of
the filing of the petition, noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts
169

See Haines, supra note 137, at 41.
See id.
171 See supra Parts II.A–C.
172 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (“If the current monthly income of the debtor and the debtor’s spouse
combined . . . .”) (emphasis added).
173 Id. § 1322(d)(1).
174 Id. § 1325(b)(2) (defining disposable income).
170
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that aggregate less than $383,175 and noncontingent, liquidated,
secured debts of less than $1,149,525 may be a debtor under chapter
13 of this title.175

The aggregation limitation of § 109(e) may now prove troublesome for samesex couples who want to file jointly because they may not qualify for a chapter
13 when the couple’s debts are aggregated together. Prior to the option to
jointly file, same-sex couples did not necessarily have to worry about the
aggregate collection of their debts because they were limited to filing
individually. Under the framework proposed in this Article however, if a samesex couple wishes to file jointly under chapter 13, their aggregated debt may
not allow them to utilize the personal restructuring of chapter 13. If a same-sex
couple chooses to file jointly with an aggregate amount of debt that exceeds
either or both the secured or unsecured debt limitations of § 109(e), the couple
may only have the option of voluntarily dismissing the case and filing
individually or completely liquidating under a joint chapter 7 bankruptcy.
Furthermore, the recognition of same-sex marriage under the Code could
have ramifications on both chapter 7 and chapter 13 liabilities because the
assets of the marital unit may become larger. Sections like 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(a)(4), which requires debtors to estimate the value of a liquidated estate
under chapter 7 in order for a chapter 13 plan to be confirmed, may
substantially increase the confirmation threshold because the Code would now
require the debtor to consider their same-sex spouse.176 Ultimately, this may
actually exclude some same-sex couples from the bankruptcy system due to
high payments or over-exempt assets when, under DOMA, they would not
have been limited in such ways.
With same-sex couples being able to file jointly under this proposed
framework, the property of the estate also changes form. 11 U.S.C. § 541
defines property of the estate for bankruptcy proceedings.177 Section 541(a)
defines property of the bankruptcy estate as, “all legal or equitable interests of
the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case,” “all interests of
the debtor and the debtor’s spouse in community property as of the
175

Id. § 109(e).
Id. § 1325(a)(4). See generally Robert F. Kidd & Frederick C. Hertz, Partnered in Debt: The Impacts
of California’s New Registered Domestic Partner Law on Creditors’ Remedies and Debtors’ Rights, Under
California Law and Under Federal Bankruptcy Law, 28 FED. CAL. BANKR. J. 148 (2006) (discussing the
ramifications of the California law which has analogous ties to the arguments set out in the article but just on a
state level scale).
177 11 U.S.C. § 541.
176
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commencement of the case,” and “[p]roceeds, product, offspring, rents, or
profits of or from property of the estate, except such as are earning from
services performed by an individual debtor after the commencement of the
case.”178 Under this framework, which allows married same-sex couples to
jointly file, the property of the estate will increase to include any property that
the same-sex couple jointly owns because of § 541(a)(2).179 Property of the
estate includes:
[a]ll interests of the debtor and the debtor’s spouse in community
property as of the commencement of the case that is under the sole,
equal, or joint management and control of the debtor; or liable for an
allowable claim against the debtor, or for both an allowable claim
against the debtor and allowable claim against the debtor’s spouse, to
the extent that such interest is so liable.180

Thus, the allowance of same-sex couples to be recognized as married under the
Code affects the scope of the bankruptcy estate, even if the same-sex couple
does not file jointly.181
Those states that have community property laws for married couples will
now be faced with an interesting change in policy under the proposed
framework of the Code.182 In particular, California’s community property law
offers an excellent example of how the recognition of same-sex marriages in
the Code can substantially alter the estate under § 541(a). Robert Kidd and
Frederick Hertz explored these issues.183 Kidd and Hertz asserted that, while
same-sex domestic partners under California law may have community
property that “significantly expands creditors’ rights in the assets of registered
domestic partners,” under DOMA, the Code did not afford such rights to
creditors.184 However, under the framework suggested in this Article, the
community property would then be available to creditors under the Code as
long as the couple is both registered as domestic partners in California and
lawfully married in a state that allows same-sex unions.185 So, under
California’s community property laws and the framework of this Article, a

178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185

Id. § 541(a).
Id. § 541(a)(2).
Id.
Id.
See Kidd & Hertz, supra note 176, at 148–53.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 157.
See Kidd & Hertz, supra note 176, at 155–58; supra Part II.A.
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married same-sex couple that files, either jointly or individually, will have their
estate expanded under the new reading of § 542(a).186
With this ability to file joint petitions under the Code, other limitations
arise with the expanded definitions of marriage and spouse. For same-sex
couples to be truly equal to their heterosexual couple counterparts, they also
must face the same limitations of the Code.
E. Alternatives to State Recognition of Same-Sex Couples Joint Filing Under
11 U.S.C. § 302(a)
If the above framework is rejected, there still may be the possibility for
same-sex couples wishing to file jointly to access the bankruptcy system. In
states such as California and New York where same-sex couples can lawfully
marry, the bankruptcy courts in those jurisdictions have allowed same-sex
couples to file jointly.187 Courts finding that same-sex couples could file
jointly,188 even with DOMA’s limiting definitions of marriage and spouse
controlling the reading of 11 U.S.C. § 302(a), justified their decisions on the
bankruptcy court’s equitable powers, specifically concerning the overarching
purposes of the bankruptcy system.189 With the bankruptcy court’s power
originating from equity, the courts have the ability to weigh the equitable
considerations of a fresh start for debtors against the necessary protections of
creditors to circumvent certain barriers that would bar a joint filing.190
An example of this use of equitable powers is in the case of In re Somers
where the court found that the United States Trustee’s motion to dismiss under
§ 707(a)191 because of DOMA required dismissal was not “in the best interests
186

Kidd & Hertz, supra note 176, at 186.
See, e.g., In re Ziviello-Howell, No. 2:11CV00916, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57838 (E.D. Cal. May 31,
2011); In re Somers, 448 B.R. 677, 682–83 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); Hauser, supra note 17, at 196.
188 See, e.g., Ziviello-Howell, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57838; Somers, 448 B.R. at 682–83.
189 See Rush, supra note 115, at 745–46 (discussing the purposes of the bankruptcy system: “to provide a
fresh start for the honest debtor” and “to protect the rights of creditors by creating an organized system that
governs the repayment of debts”).
190 See id.
191 11 U.S.C. § 707 (2012). Section 707(a) states:
187

(a) The court may dismiss a case under this chapter only after notice and a hearing and only for
cause, including—
(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
(2) nonpayment of any fees of charges required under chapter 123 of title 28; and
(3) failure of the debtor in a voluntary case to file, within fifteen days or such additional time
as the court may allow after the filing of the petition commencing such case, the information
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of all parties” and thus allowed the case to continue as a joint filing.192 The
court reasoned that since failure to abide by DOMA did not fall under any of
the provisions of § 707(a) that would permit dismissal, the Trustee’s motion
was improper.193 The court continued and explained that when determining
whether a § 707(a) motion for dismissal should be granted, the court “has
substantial discretion in ruling on a motion to dismiss under section 707(a),
and in exercising that discretion [it] must consider any extenuating
circumstances, as well as the interests of the various parties.”194 Particularly,
the court noted that when a § 707(a) motion is “not premised upon one of the
enumerated reasons” the court must give a “case-by-case analysis to determine
‘whether dismissal would be in the best interest of all parties . . . .’”195 If the
above framework were not adopted, moving forward, bankruptcy courts may
be able to frame the allowance of the same-sex joint filing as an equitable
remedy for the “best interests of all parties.”196
Along this same line of reasoning, a bankruptcy court may find that under
11 U.S.C. § 105(a), the court could allow the joint filing of a bankruptcy for a
same-sex couple.197 11 U.S.C. § 105 describes the powers of the court in
bankruptcy proceedings.198 In relevant part, 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) states: “The
court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”199 If courts were to adopt
the premise that one of the “provisions of this title”200 is to administer a
bankruptcy proceeding in “the best interests of all parties,”201 then the court
may have substantial leeway in allowing same-sex couples to file jointly if
doing so would be “appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”202
Then, much like the court in Somers, the circumstances surrounding joint
cases filed by same-sex couples may be positioned in such a way that it would
required by paragraph (1) of section 521(a), but only on a motion by the United States
trustee.
Id. at § 707(a).
192 448 B.R. at 683.
193 Id. at 682–83.
194 Id. at 682 (quoting 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 37, ¶ 707).
195 Id. at 682–83 (quoting In re Dinova, 212 B.R. 437, 442 (2d Cir. B.A.P. 1997)).
196 Id. at 683.
197 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2012).
198 Id. § 105(a).
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Somers, 448 B.R. at 683.
202 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
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be to the benefit of both the creditors and the debtors to allow the joint case to
proceed. This is because, as discussed earlier, allowing same-sex couples to
file jointly would most likely increase the assets available in the bankruptcy
estate.203 With this increase in estate property, the creditors, theoretically,
would be able to receive a greater return on their claims from the joint debtors’
estate than if they were to receive distributions from an individual’s estate. In
this formulation of court authority, it would be within the bankruptcy court’s
power to allow same-sex couples to file jointly if it were to the best interests to
all the parties.
While the Supreme Court has found DOMA’s definitional section
unconstitutional, the bankruptcy court has alternatives to ensure fair and
equitable administration of a same-sex couple’s estate if all states are not
required to allow same-sex couples to file jointly under the framework argued
for in this Article.
CONCLUSION
Following Windsor, same-sex couples who are lawfully married in a state
that recognizes such unions can now file joint bankruptcies in any state and
apply either federal exemptions or allowable state exemptions because of the
unconstitutionality of DOMA and its definitions of “spouse” and “marriage.”
The definitions of “spouse” and “marriage” in the Code should be read to
respect marriages lawfully performed in the state of celebration in light of
traditional federalism principles, which have left the definitions of marital
rights to the state. All citizens should have equal access to the Code no matter
what state of origin or sexual orientation. With multiple states now recognizing
same-sex marriages, the Code must also recognize these marriages in order to
truly be available to all citizens.
The writing is on the wall. Marriage may soon be recognized as a
fundamental right for all citizens—homosexual and heterosexual alike. The
Supreme Court heard Obergefell v. Hodges on April 28, 2015, with a decision
expected sometime in June, which looks to finally answer the question of
whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to include same-sex
couples in their definition of “marriage.” If the recent trend in federal courts is
any indication of the likelihood of how the Supreme Court will hold, the right
for same-sex couples to marry will be nationally recognized. The potential that
203

See supra Part II.D.
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questions will remain unanswered is also present. Even if state bans on samesex marriages stand, federal schemes and systems—bankruptcy included—
must adapt.
Moving forward, the interpretation proposed in this Article would
potentially result in more joint filings under chapter 7 and chapter 13 of the
Code. While some may claim that, with this increase of joint filings, creditors
may be harmed, this does not necessarily hold true. The same limitations that
governed heterosexual couples jointly filing would also apply to the joint
filings of same-sex couples. So the same safeguards that are instituted in the
Code would ensure that creditors’ interests are protected will continue to stand.
This reading of the Code would allow the estates of same-sex couples to have
more assets available to disburse to creditors because of the provisions of the
Code that view marital property as an asset of the estate, whether filing jointly
or not. This larger estate would increase the disbursement each individual
creditor would get in either a chapter 7 or chapter 13 joint filing or individual
filing, putting the creditors in a better posture post-discharge.
Even if the framework propped in this Article is not adopted, bankruptcy
courts still have alternatives that would allow same-sex couples to file jointly
through the court’s equity powers. While bankruptcy courts have notably
limited their use of equity powers under 11 U.S.C. § 105, the benefit of these
joint filings for administrative ease and benefit to all interested parties
overcomes this hesitation. This not only further promotes the “fresh start” for
the same-sex debtors but also ensures efficiency and consolidation for the
bankruptcy court. By further streamlining the bankruptcy process to promote
efficiency, the resources of the bankruptcy court can now be focused on
finding the best outcome for both the debtors and creditors rather than having
the court enter a highly political debate on same-sex marriage. It will allow the
court to focus on furthering the purposes of the Code.
Overall, the framework proposed in this Article will allow bankruptcy
filings by same-sex couples to actually reflect the realities of their economic
condition rather than creating a legal fiction through the illusion of individual
filings. When DOMA controlled the Code, same-sex couples had to file
individually and contour their finances to fit within the individual filing
requirements of the Code. However, under this Article’s framework, same-sex
couples would be able to file a joint bankruptcy petition that outlines more
precisely their joint property, debts, accounts, etc. The ability to file jointly, as
a marital unit, would be a true image of the debtors’ finances as compared to
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forcing the debtors to file individually because of discriminatory definitions of
“marriage” and “spouse.” Essentially, this framework allows for more truthful
filings, which in turn would further promote the purposes of the bankruptcy
system.
Same-sex marriage will continue to sit, at least for the foreseeable future, at
the center of heated moral, political, and legal debates in this nation. These
debates, though, should not be so construed as to deny lawfully married
couples the right and opportunity to jointly access the bankruptcy system. The
protections of the Code have become increasingly more important in a time of
economic crisis. With stories of home foreclosures and harassment by debt
collectors on the rise, it is essential for citizens to have the chance to enjoy a
federal system that could alleviate the burden of debt that has become far too
common. The interpretation presented in this Article would ensure that each
citizen would be able to utilize the Bankruptcy Code for the purpose of a
“fresh start.”

